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INTRODllCTION
Appellam will continue to refer to the panies to

appeal in the same manner as they

are referred 10 in the opening brief. The Respondent Bank

Commerce (the "Bank"). and

Appellant. Jefferson Enterprises. LLC ("Jefferson"). J The Bank in its Response Brief generally
follows the arguments made before the District Court and recites the same facts and law as were
argued before the Court. However. the Bank argues against the determinations made belO'w in
respect to its findings that an agreement by the bank to take a second priority position on a part
of the collateral for the loan existed and that Jefferson had a Prospective Economic Advantage.
Jefferson replies with the following.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Bank Agreed to Subordinate.

The Bankpresents a number of factual statements gleaned from the affidavit of Steve
WOlion. The statements are disputed by Jefferson, and were 110t relied upon by the trial court in
its Memorandum Decision. The dispute concerning these facts is well documented in the record
and are material and relevant to the issues in this appeaL
The Bank relies on the affidavit of Steve Worton in an attempt to establish that "as early

as at least April 21, 2006, that its mortgage would need to be in first position for all property
securing the loan to Jeffersen(sic) ... " (Respondents Briefp. 2). Pamela Wake who was present at
the meeting on April 21, 2006, stated in her deposition CR. at Vol. II, p. 438 Depo. P. Wake p. 68,

Lines 10-14) that:
10.

Q.

And you don't recall any discussions during

11. your April 21, 2006, meeting of subordinating Mr.
12. Morrison, having his lender subordinate to the bank on
1

Jefferson agrees that a typo was made as pointed out and corrected by the Bank in its footnote.
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· 80 Acres. Inc .. property?
14.

A.

No.

Dustin Mon-ison in his deposition teslified

all

.;.66 Depo.

p.

Line.1 20-25 p56 Lines 1-3) that:
20. Development. And then we melon the 8th. I believe. or
21. the 9th, or we spoke on the 9th, I guess. about the 80
22. Acres. Inc .. piece. And I knov, Steve testified or
23. whatever you call it that you do in a deposition that I
24. had always represented that we could get subordination
25. on 80 Acres, Inc., and it \:vas absolutely false, never

1. represented that, never hinted to that. And the notion
2. seems just silly to me that why would 80 Acres, Inc.,
3. give up a first position with no consideration.
Eric Polatis as a Title Officer for First American Title paliicipated in the preparation of a
series of Commitments for Title Insurance on real property in a transaction between the Bank
and Jefferson. The transaction involved the Bank loaning money to Jefferson, to be secured bv
real propeliy located in BalU10ck County, Idaho. After the issuance of the First ConU11itment,
Mr. Polatis met with representatives of the Bank including Steve Worton to discuss and explain
the contents of the Commitment and in paliiculm- the exceptions set out in the Commitment. The
meeting took place sometime during the first week of May 2006 at First i\merican Title
Company's offices in Pocatello. Mr. Polatis states that the representatives of the Bank did not
express any need to have the first mortgage holder on Parcel 4, "80 Acres, Inc." subordinate it's
interest under the mortgage to the in order to complete the transaction with Jefferson Enterprises,
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or that Jefferson would be required to pay orr the 80 Acres. Inc.. obligation as a condition
oftl1e closing. (R. at "of. Ill.

551

~~

2.3and 6)

Mr. Polatis leamed some time on May 9. 2006 that there were problems \\'ith the pending
closing involving the transaction because the Bank was requiring that Jefferson have 80 Acre.
Inc .. subordinate it's mortgage to the Bank of Commerce. The need for the subordination had not
been discussed in the meeting that occUlTed a few days earlier \\'ith the representatives of the
Bank. CR. at Vol. III. p.552. "~ff

Polaris ~ 10).

1. The Subordination Agreement is Not Barred bv the Statute of Frauds.
The court below stated that" This Court has also accepted as true that the conditions of
the loan agreement provided, among oTher things. that the Bank would be secured 071 the 80 Acre
parcel in a second priority position". 2 The court disposed of the argument in its detem1ination

that the agreement to subordinate was barred by the Statute of Frauds, in particular §9-505(5).

3

There is no dispute that the bank agreed to loan money in excess of $50,000.00 and in fact did
loan Jefferson in excess of two million dollars. However, the Court below reached a legal
conclusion that subordination agreement was barred by the Statute of Frauds. The standard of
review adopted by this court when ruling on issues of law that were considered in a ruling on
summary judgment are stated as follows: "This Court conducts a de novo review of a district
court's grant of summary judgment, using the standard the trial court used in ruling on the
motion". Taylor v. A1cNichols, 149 Idaho 826,832,243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010) (quoting Curlee v.
Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008)). Therefore, the

2

A1emorandum Decision and Order on Motiol11O Reconsider, R. Vol. 111 p. 733

3 I.e. 9-505(5) "A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant or extend credit in an original
principal amount offzfty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) or more made by a person or entity engaged in
the business of lending money or extending credit."
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Court affirms a grant of summary judgment
file. together with the affidavits. if any.

..the pleadings.

and admissions on

tha1 there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving pany is entitled 10 a judgment as a matter of law. ,. IR.
there is no question of material facL only a question of

Im;\

remains. over ,\"hich this Coun

exercises free review. ,. }'ounghlood 1'. Higbee. 1..f5 Idaho 665, 668.
(citing Kieheri

1'.

56(c) "\Vhen

Goss, 1..f4 Idaho 225. 22-, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (200

P. 3d 1199. 1202 (2008)

Under this standard.

"disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving pany, and all reasonable inferences that
can be drav,/n from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving pany. ,. SlOnebrook Const.,

LLC 1'.. Chase Home Fin., LLC. I52 Idaho 927, 929, 2;- P.3d 374, 3 7 6 (2012) (quoting Curlee,
1481daho at 394,224 P.3d at .:161). The court below interpreted the legal issue of'whether the

Statute of Frauds barred the Bmtle's agreement to subordinate to the 80 Acre encumbrance,
treating that agreement as an agreement to loan money in excess of fifty thousand dollars. That
detem1ination is subject to the standard of review of this court that: "Interpretation of an
ordinance or statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review-." Lane
Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 89, 175 P.3d 776, 778 (2007) (citing Friends of
Farm 10 },1arket v. Valley Cnty., 137 Idaho 192, 196,46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). "We apply the same

principles in construing municipal ordinances as we do in the construction of statutes." Friends
afFarm to A111., 137 Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14 (quoting Cunningham v. City ofTH'in Falls, 125

Idaho 776, 779, 874 P.2d 587, 590 (Ct.App.1994)). Kootenai County v. Harriman-Sayler, --P.3d ----, 2012 WL 6621149 (Idaho, 2012).
The issue of the agreement on the part of the Bank to take a second priority position on
the 80 Acre parcel is not an agreement (not in writing) to loan money in excess of the $50,000.00
threshold of the Statute of Frauds. The agreement only affects collateral for the loan. By the
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plain unambiguous language of the statute it

nol bar the agreement made

a second priority position. "The interpretation

a statute 'must begin \\ith the

Bank to
words

of the statute: those vvords mUST be given their plain, usual. and ordinary meaning: and the statute
must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous. this Court does not construe it but
simply follows the law as written.' " T'erska

1'.

893.265 P.3d 502. 506 (2011) (quoting Slale

1'.

SainI Alphol1sUS Reg?

Crr .. 15] Idaho 889.

ScIl1Fart:::, 139 Idaho 360. 362, 79 P.3d 719,

(2003)). "A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction." Porter

1'.

Bd. (!/Tru5;lees. Presron Schoo! Disl.

"~'o.

201, 141 Idaho 1L 14, 105

P.3d 671, 674 (2004). "We have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous,
legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the pUlvose of
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." Verska. 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506
(quoting

Cit)'

q/SUl1 Valley 1'. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)).

2. Consideration
Jefferson gave consideration for the agreement by agreeing to provide its equity position
in the 80 Acre parcel as collateral for the loan. The Bank \vas providing financing to purchase
the Wood property but not the 80 Acre parcel. Jefferson's agreement providing the consideration
of allowing the Bank to have a second priority secured interest in the property is sufficient to
support the agreement. To be enforceable at law, an agreement must be supported by valid
consideration. Greal Plains Equip., Inc.
627, 642 (1999).

* * *

1'.

N W Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 769, 979 P.2d

Generally, courts will not assess the sufficiency of consideration.

A1cJi1ahon v. Auger, 83 Idaho 27, 38-39, 357 P.2d 374, 380 (1960). Consideration "must have
some value in the eyes of the law; but in the absence of fraud or overreaching, the promisor, if
competent, can fix on anyihing not in itself unlaVvful as a consideration and put his own value on
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it. and \vhether it is equiyalent"

10

the benefit bargained for is a matter lef1to the determination

of the parties. Jd. (quoting

C.J.S. \\'i11s ~ 1]

Inc..152 Idaho 519. 272 P.3d

1(Idaho 2(12). Dustin Morrison testified about the consideration

1)). Freise!)'. Bearer

for the second priority position in his deposition clearly explaining that the equity in the 80 Acre
parcel as collateral

~was

what he was offering.

(R~ al

T'ol. II

p~4

Depo. D.

p. 1U9,

Lines 3-1U)
3. A. The balance ofyalue or the balance of equity,
4. \vhether that be a second position or not whatever that

5. value was, could be a guarantee, it could be whatever,
6. would be subordinated by me, from me to the Bank of

7, Conmlerce. But nothing would ever be subordinated by 80
8. Acres, Inc., neyer represented, never implied. In fact
9. quite the opposite on this (indicating), that he said

10. was the first page of my loan request.
B. THE BANK INTENTIONALLY INTERFERED 'VITH A PROSPECTIVE

ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
The District Court detemlined that Court detemlined there "was a valid economic
expectancy by Jefferson and that the Bank was aware of that expectancy." 4

However, the

disputed facts show that the Bank was aware that if it insisted on having Jefferson use its
working capital to pay off the 80 Acre encumbrance that the advantage would be lost. The Bank
also knew that the capital ratios that it relied upon in making the loan would have changed to the
point that the Bank would not have made the loan if the information had been made kll0\Vn to the

4

Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Reconsider, R. Vol. III p. 736
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Bank's Board of Directors. Steve \A/orton the
al

"of.

II ]7.-1-66 DC]7o. S.
7.

WOrlOn]7. -3,

And the board

Vice

testified in his deposition (ie.

Lines --_

directors in this short

8. period of time between their approval on the 9th and the
9. loan closing on the 1Otb bad no opportunity to reviev,
10. the loan itself to see if any of those numbers or
11. financials would have changed based

011

how the loan was

12. actually closed?

13.ANo.
14. Q. On the 9th had that working capital, if the
15. working capital amount was over $700,000 less than what

16. was presented to the board, would you have reconunended
17. the loan for approval?
18. A. No.
19. Q. And do you believe that the board would have
20. approved it with that change?
21. A. No.

\r./ orton also knew at the time of the closing that the only likely source of money to pay

off the 80 Acre encumbrance would have been from Jefferson's working capital.

p.466 Depo. S. Trortonp. 73, Lines 7-21), \vhere WOlion states:
13. Q. Did M1'. Monison tell you where he was going
14. to get the money to close the loan?
15. A. No, he didn't.
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CR. at Vol. II

16.
17.

From your re\'iev,

financial informati 011.
\\'as going 10 get

was the most

18. the money?
19. A. Cash in the bank.

20. Q. And that \\'as a significant portion of the
21. working capital that you had referenced in 803.
22. A. Yes.
There are clearly disputed issues of fact that support the inference that the Bank
knew that the requirement of paying off the 80 Acre encumbrance would materially interfere not
only with the advantage of that transaction but would also reduce the financial resources of
Jefferson to the point that it would not have been able to qualify for the loan with the Bank. The
inf01111ation about the requirement of the use of working capital to place the Bank in a first
priority position was not cOllli11Unicated to the Board of Directors of the Bank prior to their
approval of the loan. These underlying circumstance support the inference from the disputed
facts that the Bank intended to interfere with the transaction.

Jefferson was immediately

damaged by the loss of its working capital and the loss of the favorable te1111S of the 80 Acre
financial alTangement.
C. FR4.UD AND lVlISREPRESENTATION
1. Reliance on Misrepresentations.

Jefferson had the "right to rely" on the misrepresentation made by the Bank that it would
not allow Jefferson and the related businesses to fail and that the Bank would provide operating
funds to Jefferson to that end. The substance of the representation relied upon by Jefferson is
summarized by Dustin Morrison The substance of the representation relied upon by Jefferson is
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summarized by Dustin Morrison (R. at T'01 JI p.·ro Depo. D Morrison p. -..,
tha1:
12. Steve says there is no way the bank wants you
13. to fail. there is no way that the bank wants this 10
14. fail. there is no way the bank wants this as an asset.
15. So do \.vhatever you think is the right thing for you to
16. do, but if you do this. my hunch is that you will be
17. able to come back into this bank and they will consider
18. whatever your loss \.vas.
19. So we did that, and we did come back into the
20. bank several months later with applications for
21. construction money to continue our operation in Stone
22. Creek Estates and were denied that. And we brought that
23. in at the encouragement of Steve.
24. So we moved forward understanding that it
25. would be the bank's effort to mitigate this impact of
1. this new requirement on our business.
2. Q. And that's based on what you claim Steve
3. Worton told you?
4. A. He didn't say those words, but yes.
Under the circumstances Jefferson's right to rely is not detennined using the negligence
concept of "reasonableness," because negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort such as
fraud. W Prosser & W Keeton, The Law a/Torts § 108 (5th Ed. 1984), at 750. Rather, Jefferson
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a right to rely on another's misrepresentations unless
unreasonable. in the

the information apparen1 to

loss is its o'"vn responsibility." Id. Moreover. right
jury. Umphrey

1'.

to

conduct is "so utterlv

that the Jaw may properly

rely. like mtent. is a question

thm its
fact for the

Sprinkel. 106 Idaho 700. 709. 682 P.2d 1247. 1256 (1983).

Fraudulent intent rarely is susceptible of direct proof and normally must be established by
circumstantial evidence. Cresswell

1'.

Sullivan & Cromwell. 704

Supp. 392, 406 (S.D.KY.

1989). Panies who are guilty of fraud rarely will admit that they intended to defraud. Rather,
intent may be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances and is a question of fact for
the jury. W Prosser & TY Keeton, supra at 742. Idaho law recognizes that the intent element can
be established by circumstantial evidence, and that once plaintiff establishes intent by
circumstantial evidence, "the burden of coming forward \'vith rebuttal evidence shifts to the
defendant." DBSIITRI V v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 948 P.2d 151 (Idaho 1997). Neither Steve
\Vorton nor any other officer of the Bank present any undisputed fact that Bank did not intend
for Jefferson to rely on Worton's representations. There was abundant circumstantial evidence
presented in the form of disputed facts from which the Court below should have found the
representations made by Worton on behalf of the bank were intentional and were made for the
purpose of inducing Jefferson to expend the working capital and relinquish the favorable te1111S
of the 80 Acre transaction.
3. DamaQ:es from Fraud.
Jefferson by its reasonable reliance on the representations of the Banle suffered damages.
Those damages resulted from the loss of its working capital, its inability to perf01111 the loan
obligations and the inability to continue to operate the other related businesses. The substance of
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the damages suffered
P.

~7

1,

'l

JefTerson is summarized
'15 ]),

A. Absolutely.

Dustin

(R aT

J-J ()) slating that:
1'\\0

tOlally different issues.

3. One is I can't have my cash that's been spen1
4. reimbursed. The other thing is that they have approved
5. this loan based on. No. 1. my income and my capacity to
6. earn. No.2. my liquidity and ability to debt seryice

7. over time because \ve knew this project wouldn't generate
8. a dime based on these numbers that I proyided the bank
9. as a break even point of year four or year seven. So it
10. was going to require debt service for a period of time.
11. Keep in mind the reimbursement wasn't to come
12. to my pocket, it was to go to a CD to debt service the

13. darn loan at Bank of COlmnerce. That's one issue, I can
14. live without that issue.
15. The problem \vas we have approved you based on

16. your capacity to earn and your capacity to debt service
17. this loan and now you fully acknowledge, Steve,

18. everybody acknowledges there is not an option for
19. subordination, guys. They are not going to just for
20. free give up first position, we have to pay this off if
21. we want first position. In order to pay that off we are
22. going to liquidate our working capital, which will
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T

II J7. -F()

23. substantially affect our ability to earn because we are
24. a spec home construction company. $700.000 borrows
25. million: right?

percent you know. so ·whatever.

.5

1. million. I guess.
'J

Q. But you continued to operate after that.

3. didn't you?
4.

No. we suffered. we bled. desperately. So

5. when I told Steve this. you understand there is no way I
6. can maintain my business vvithout my workjng capital.
7. That working capital will disappear if I do \vhat you are
8. asking me to do. If I don't do what you are asking me
9. to do, I lose this project and every dime that I have
10. spent on this project to date.
The arguments of the Bank as they relate to damages are not applicable here because this
fraud did not relate to misrepresented benefits of a transaction. Rather, the fraud here caused
detrimental action and the loss of working capital, which could reasonably be foreseen to cause
pecuniary loss in the form of increased costs and lost income. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 548A. Thi s court has stated that: "The underlying principle is that the victim of fraud is
entitled to compensation for every wrong which is the natural and proximate result of the fraud.
The measure of damages which should be adopted under the facts of a case is the one which will
effect such result." Watts v. Krebs, 962 P.2d 387, 392 (Idaho 1998) (citations omitted) (quoting

TiVeit::ell'. Jukich, 251 P.2d 542, 546 (Idaho 1952)).
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D. NOYA TJ01\\
The Bank ciles its two notes and tvvo mongages 10

defense

JL'I.J,"_"

The contention by the Bank is tha1 even if there were valid agreements on the issue of priority

J efferson's execution of those documents resulted in a novation. "The making of a new contract
does not necessarily abrogate a f01111er contract unless it explicitly rescinds it. deals with the
subject matter so comprehensively as to be complete in itself or is so inconsistent ,,,,·ith the first
contract that the two cannot stand together." OpporTUnity.

C

1'.

Osscwardc. 136 Idaho 602.

38 P.3d 1258 (Idaho 2002). The disputed facts establish that the first MOltgage prepared by the
Bank did not specifically rescind the earlier agreement. In facL the first Mortgage specifically
recognizes that the agreement for a second priority position 'was acceptable.

The second

M0l1gage resulted from the Bank's desire to loan additional funds to service the interest payment
on the first M0l1gage. The Bank explained the second loan as fo11O\;\,s: (R. at Vol. II. p.470 Depo.
lv1. Morrison p. 82, Lines 2-21)

2. A. Could you explain additional funding?

3. Q. Were there additional loans made to Mr.
4. Morrison -- not Mr. Monison, but Jefferson Enterprises?
5. A. Yes.
6. Q. \\7J1at was the reason for that?
7. A. Interest.
8. Q. Can you describe the circumstances of how the
9. that -- you know, the timeframe and what was done?

10. A. So we made the loan in 2006 -- I guess if you
11. would refer to 1408.
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12.

Okay.

13. A.

e have

a

. the loan has

l1's still there. the bridge loan has matured

\lve

15. have interest that's due. And so in June Dustin made
16. application for $400.000 to pay interest on the bank and
17. then create an interest reserve to allow -- and the
18. intention was to allow him to continue marketing the
19. property. to either find an investor or get it sold.
20. whatever. It '"vas to work with the customer and give him
21. more time and bring the loan current.
The second loan transaction did not involve the novation of the earlier agreements with
Jefferson.

CONCLUSION
The District Court found the existence of an agreement to take a second priority position
on the 80 Acre parcel. As a matter of law the Statute of Frauds does not bar the agreement. The
disputed material issues of fact establish that the Bank intentionally interfered with Jefferson's
prospective economic advantage, the Bank knew that the interference would cause Jefferson
damage and Jefferson was damaged.
There are disputed material Issues of fact showing that the Bank intentionally made
representations with the intent that Jefferson would rely upon them, Jefferson did reasonably rely
upon those representations and did suffer damages.
Jefferson did not agree to rescind the agreement relating to the 80 Acre security position
and there are no undisputed facts that establish novation of that agreement.
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the foregoing reasons.

respectfull) requests that the DecIsions.

Judgments of the District Court be oven-uled.
Dated this 8th day of January. 2013.
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